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# The distribution of the gender pay gap in Austria: Evidence from matched employer-employee data and tax records<sup>\*</sup>

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#### Abstract

We examine the gender wage gap in Austria using new matched employer-employee data from 2007. We investigate the gap at the conditional wage distribution of men and women, and decompose it into the parts which are attributed to different characteristics and different returns to these characteristics. We find that women earn on average about 14% less than men for given characteristics, and that about 50% of the gender wage gap cannot be attributed to observable characteristics. The extent of different returns for women and men increase over the wage distribution where wage bargaining is predominantly on an individual basis (in contrast to low wage jobs, where collective bargaining contracts are binding).

Keywords: gender wage differentials, quantile regressions, decomposition, matched employer-employee data

JEL classification: J31, J71

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## 1 Introduction

Compared to other countries, the gender pay gap in Austria is large. In 2008, it was equal to 25.5% as measured by the EU gender pay gap indicator (European Commission, 2010). The EU gender pay gap indicator measures the average difference between men's and women's gross hourly earnings.<sup>1</sup> Of all EU countries, only the Czech Republic fared worse. To fight this gap, Austrian policy makers required firms to disclose the wages of their workers (Bundeskanzleramt, 2010). Currently, only large firms are covered by the new law, but over time also smaller firms will need to disclose their workers' wages. In addition, affirmative action with countries such as Norway and Spain as role models is often debated. Norway, for example, requires a minimum of 40% of each gender in publicly appointed boards and in all boards of directors in private, shareholder-owned businesses. Spain imposed a similar rule for public sector committees and boards (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2007).

The EU gender pay gap indicator, however, does not account for differences between men and women in education, labor market experience or other productivity related variables. To account for these differences, we use a newly constructed data set and decompose the mean wages of men and women in the private and public sector using the technique developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).<sup>2</sup> This new data set is constructed from administrative files, for the first time matching census information with tax records and social security data, to gauge the reliability of gender wage gap estimates. These new data allow us to go beyond the information typically available in survey data. In particular, we investigate how important it is to account for actual experience, by contrasting the estimated gender pay gaps using exact personal career information with estimates based on the limited information typically available in survey data. In addition, we identify career interruptions and investigate how much estimates of the gender pay gap differ if we ignore the type of interruptions. Another

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For Austria, the gender pay gap is calculated with earnings data from the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). In contrast to household surveys such as the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the SES samples only employees in enterprizes with at least ten employees in the private sector (Geisberger and Till, 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>There are numerous papers investigating the gender pay gap. For a meta-analysis of studies on the gender pay gap see Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005); for surveys on gender discrimination see Altonji and Black (1999) and Bertrand (2010). In an accompanying paper, we examine the change of the gender wage gap in Austria in the private sector between 2002 and 2007 (Böheim et al., 2011).

set of variables that may explain a part of the gender pay gap are firm-specific variables, which are typically not available in survey data. From our matched employer-employee data, we calculate *inter alia* the ratio of female to male workers within the firm or the ratio for the female to the male median wage in the firm.

The public discussion generally focuses on the average gender pay gap. However, this discussion might be misleading if the gender pay gap differs over the wage distribution. A comprehensive study by Arulampalam et al. (2007) uses the European Community Household Panel, which includes harmonized data on wages and other individual characteristics from various European countries for the years 1995 to 2001. The authors find that in nearly all of the eleven analyzed countries the estimated wage gaps are larger at the top of the distribution than at the bottom of the distribution.<sup>3</sup> We also estimate quantile regressions and contrast the evidence from our estimates with those we obtain from limited information. Here, we follow Melly (2006) and estimate counterfactual distributions, allowing the decomposition of changes in the wage distribution into changes in the regression coefficients, changes in the distribution of covariates and changes in the residuals.

We find that women earn on average about 0.14 log points less than men for given characteristics, and that about 50% of the gender wage gap cannot be attributed to observable characteristics. Differences in returns to characteristics between women and men increase over the wage distribution. This could be attributed to wage bargaining which is predominantly on an individual basis in the high wage segment of the labor marker, in contrast to low wage jobs where collective bargaining contracts are the norm. Our findings also demonstrate a remarkable resilience of the estimates. To be sure, the estimates become smaller, the more precise data one has at hands, however, what matters most are good wage information and detailed career information. In our data, the results do hardly change if we account for e.g., the exact number of days on maternity leave—for all practical purposes, an indicator of having been on maternity leave suffices to obtain a reliable estimate of the gender wage gap.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Other studies have also found significant differences in the gender gap at different quantiles of the log wage distribution. Examples are Albrecht et al. (2003) for Sweden, Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2001) for the UK, Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) for Switzerland, Gupta et al. (2006) for Denmark, De la Rica et al. (2008) for Spain, Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) for Germany and Albrecht et al. (2009) for the Netherlands.

Firm-specific information additionally contributes to the explanation of the gender pay gap. As can be expected, we find evidence that the firm-specific variables are important wage components and, for example, a higher ratio of female to male workers implies lower wages. We also find that firm-specific variables explain a part of the gender pay gap, for example, the more women work in a firm, the lower is the gender pay gap. If we extend the set of explanatory variables accounting for human capital (eduction, experience, etc), occupation and industry to include the firm-specific variables as well, the unexplained gender pay gap decreases (in absolute values) from about 0.18 log points to about 0.14 log points, a difference of about 0.04 log points.

## 2 Data and summary statistics

We combine data from Austrian administrative records to construct a new data set to overcome potential weaknesses in earlier studies. Data are from the Austrian General Income Report for 2007, which itself combines data from tax records and the Austrian micro-censuses of 2007, and from the Austrian social security records.<sup>4</sup> An anonymous personal identifer allows the combination of these data, which provides us with data for the analysis of gender wage differences.<sup>5</sup> The merged data contain human capital variables, such as education and experience, workplace characteristics, such as the number of women or the fraction of young workers in a particular workplace, and also complete work histories since 1972, and the sample size corresponds to the number of observations in the micro-censuses.

The Austrian General Income Report, published every other year, provides statistics on the income of all employees, self-employed persons and pensioners in Austria. The Report uses data from tax records; wage data are based on approximately 8.4 million pay slips collected by the Austrian tax authorities and provide information on gross yearly income, paid taxes, paid social contributions and extra compensations. The tax data do not contain information

 $<sup>^{4}</sup>$ The Austrian General Income Report is described in Statistik Austria (2009) and in Rechnungshof (2008). The social security records are described in Zweimüller et al. (2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>To ensure the anonymity, the actual merging of the data has been handled by an authorized third party. No data that would allow identification of individual persons has been made available to us.

on the number of hours worked and, in addition, taxes are individual data and it is not possible to build household information from the official tax records. For the purposes of the Austrian General Income Report, the tax data are combined with data from the Austrian micro-censuses to generate household level information and to obtain information on e.g., hours worked or formal qualifications. It is therefore an excellent source of information on wage income for employees (Statistik Austria, 2008).

The Austrian micro-census is a quarterly panel survey which collects information on private households. It is representative of the Austrian population and contains information on about 80,000 individuals per year. Every quarter a fifth of the sample is renewed. The micro-census provides information on hours worked, education and detailed information on individual and household characteristics, but it does not contain income information. Combining the information from the micro-census and the tax records allows us to compute exact hourly gross and net wages.

The Austria social security data contain information on individual work experience, tenure and characteristics of the workplace, such as industry or region. A firm's identifier permits the construction of workplace characteristics such as the number of women of the fraction of young workers in a particular workplace. The data also include the reasons for and the length of work interruptions such as unemployment spells or the birth of a child.

Our estimating sample consists of workers who were between 16 and 60 years of age and who worked at least for one hour per week. To account for possible seasonal fluctuations, we restrict our sample to workers who worked for at least 270 days in 2007. Part-time work is defined as working less than 35 hours per week. The sample consists of 4,446 women and 8,919 men who worked in private sector. Table 1 provides summary statistics on our estimating sample. The difference in mean wages in 2007 was almost  $\leq 4$  per hour in the private sector, and women earned on average some 25% less than men, not accounting for differences in characteristics. This "raw" gap was slightly higher than in 1997, when it was about 23.3% (Böheim et al., 2007). Comparing the private sector with the public sector, we see that the difference in mean wages between men and women was smaller in the public than in the private sector.

Figure 1 plots the distribution of the log hourly wages of men and women in the private sector and Figure 2 includes also full-time employees in the public sector. Both graphs show the same pattern, namely that women's wage distribution is in shape similar to men's, but to the left of it. Women are also slightly less compressed in their wages than men as the peak in their wage distribution is lower than the corresponding peak in the men's distribution. Such distributions are of course only descriptive and do not indicate that women are (unfairly) discriminated against.

One of the most important determinants of the wage is probably the amount of formal education. Women in our sample have on average more formal education than men, however, there are relatively more women who have only compulsory education than men. While women are on average two years younger than men, their average labor market experience difference is about 3.5 years shorter, owing to motherhood and child care responsibilities. Most studies on the gender wage gap can only account for potential experience as the length of and the reasons for work time interruptions is usually not known. Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (1994) and Böheim et al. (2007) have demonstrated that it is necessary to account for differences in actual rather than potential experience to obtain reliable estimates of the wage determinants. The summary statistics also show that fewer women than men are married.

The differences in wages might also be related to differences in the workplaces in which women and men work. The summary statistics support such an hypothesis since, for example, women work in smaller workplaces and firms than men, and more women than men work in the public sector. Whether this is the outcome of a selection process or already due to discrimination against women is beyond the scope of the current analysis. However, it should be noted that there are marked differences in the distribution across sectors, for example, the majority of women (27%) works in the retail sector and the majority of men (39%) in manufacturing. We also see that women are concentrated amongst office workers, while men are typically working as craftspersons. Not only do we observe differences in the occupational hierarchy, there is also clear evidence for differences in within-firm hierarchies as merely about 4% of women, in contrast to some 7% of men, have an executive position.

## 3 Methods

As our main tool of analysis we use decomposition techniques and decompose mean wages as well as the wages across the distribution. To decompose mean wages of women and men, we use the technique developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) and estimate a wage equation for women (W) and men (M) separately with ordinary least squares:

$$\ln y_i = \beta_i X_i + \epsilon_i, \qquad i = W, M, \tag{1}$$

where  $y_i$  is the hourly wage,  $\beta_i$  are the coefficients to be estimated,  $X_i$  is a vector of characteristics, and  $\epsilon_i$  is an i.i.d. error. The difference in the mean wages can be re-written as:

$$\overline{\ln y}_M - \overline{\ln y}_W = \hat{\beta}_M (\overline{X}_M - \overline{X}_W) + (\hat{\beta}_M - \hat{\beta}_W) \overline{X}_M, \qquad (2)$$

where  $\hat{\beta}_M(\overline{X}_M - \overline{X}_W)$  is difference of the mean characteristics, evaluated at men's prices and  $(\hat{\beta}_M - \hat{\beta}_W)\overline{X}_W$  is the difference in returns to characteristics. The first part is the explained component of the wage difference, i.e., the part which can be ascribed to differences in productivity and the second part is the unexplained component, i.e., the part which cannot be ascribed to differences in productivity. In this way, the difference in mean logarithmic wages is a weighted sum of differences in characteristics and of differences in prices. Equation (1) corresponds to the "male-based" decomposition which assumes that men are paid their marginal product and women are negatively discriminated against. Another way to decompose wages, a "female-based" view, is to assume that women are paid their marginal product and men are positively discriminated against. These two views are limiting cases of the generalized linear

decomposition (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1995):

$$\overline{\ln y}_M - \overline{\ln y}_W = \hat{\beta}^* (\overline{X}_M - \overline{X}_W) + (\hat{\beta}_M - \hat{\beta}^*) \overline{X}_M + (\hat{\beta}^* - \hat{\beta}_F) \overline{X}_F, \tag{3}$$

where  $\hat{\beta}^*$  is a weighted average of the coefficient vectors  $\hat{\beta}_M$  and  $\hat{\beta}_F$ :

$$\hat{\beta}^* = \Omega \hat{\beta}_M + (I - \Omega) \hat{\beta}_F, \tag{4}$$

where  $\Omega$  is a weighting matrix and I is an identity matrix. The decomposition equations proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) represent special cases of the generalized equation in which  $\Omega$  is a null-matrix or equal to I. Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1995) estimate a pooled model to derive the counterfactual coefficient vector  $\hat{\beta}^*$ . We follow Reimers (1983) who assumes  $\hat{\beta}^* = \frac{1}{2}\hat{\beta}_M + \frac{1}{2}\hat{\beta}_F$ .

These approaches focus on the mean of the wage distribution and therefore may provide only a limited picture of the differences in wages between women and men. Several authors have found that the mean wage gaps are not representative of the whole distribution. For example, Arulampalam et al. (2007) use the European Community Household Panel, which includes harmonized data on wages and other individual characteristics from various European countries for the years 1995 to 2001. They find that in nearly all of the eleven analyzed countries there is a glass ceiling, i.e., the estimated wage gaps are larger at the top of the distribution than at the bottom of the distribution.

To not only have a look at the the effects of gender and other observables on the conditional mean of the logarithmic wage distribution, but also on different quantiles, we run quantile regressions.<sup>6</sup> Such a regression model specifies the q-th conditional quantile of the logarithmic wage distribution as a linear function of characteristics:

$$\ln y_{iq} = \beta_{iq} X_i + \epsilon_{iq}, \qquad i = W, M, \tag{5}$$

 $<sup>^{6}</sup>$ For an introduction and an overview to quantile regression see Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001).

where  $q \in (0, 1)$  and  $\text{Quant}(\epsilon_{iq}|X_i) = 0$ . For each quantile q, we estimate one equation for women, W, and men, M, each. While ordinary least square regressions have the property that the mean of the dependent variable and the mean of the explanatory variables are on the regression line, which makes the decomposition of the dependent variable straightforward, the estimators for the quantile regression models do not have this property. We therefore use a different procedure to calculate the gender wage gap at the q-the quantile to differences in returns adjusted for characteristics. We follow Melly (2006) and estimate counterfactual distributions, allowing the decomposition of changes in distribution into three factors: changes in regression coefficients, changes in the distribution of covariates and changes in residuals.<sup>7</sup>

## 4 Estimation results

Tables 2 and 3 present the estimated coefficients of two specifications of the gross hourly wage, for full-time men and women in the private sector and in the private and public sector combined. The two specifications differ in the treatment of past labor force statuses, the first specification uses a less detailed measure of past non-employment spells than the second specification. The results do not differ much between specifications, however, the second specification explains slightly more variation in the dependent variable than the first. Thus, we concentrate on the second specification from now on.

The estimated coefficients indicate, for example, that more formal education is associated with higher wages. For example, men with a high school degree earn 37.7 percent more than men with only compulsory schooling. For women, the respective number is equal to 41.0 percent. Men with a university degree earn 50 percent more than men with only compulsory schooling and women earn 47.5 percent more. The estimated coefficients for lower formal education differ considerably between men and women, while differences in secondary and tertiary education are small. The lower estimates for women with apprenticeship may reflect gender-specific educational choices in Austria. Typically, young women choose schools or apprenticeships with social or commercial specialization and young men choose some form of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>We use the Stata code proposed in that paper for our estimates.

technical education. Interestingly, gender-specific specialization also takes place in tertiary education, but here the differences in the returns are lower.

The estimated coefficients further indicate that more experience is also associated with higher wages, whereas unemployment spells, periods of parental leave or times sick are associated with lower wages. In contrast, time in the military has a strong positive effect for both women and men, although this effect is only significant for the latter. We suspect that individuals obtain additional skills like a driver's licence for trucks during their time in the military finally resulting in higher wages.

In addition, wages clearly differ by the type of workplace and they are typically higher in larger workplaces, in banks and in urban areas. We also find statistical evidence for an association between wages and the gender composition of the workplace. Both men and women are estimated to have a significantly lower wage the more women are employed in the firm. This effect is equal to 18.4 percent for women and 22.3 percent for men. However, the ratio of women's to men's wages in the firm is estimated to have a negative relationship with men's wages only, for women we do not find such an association.

#### 4.1 Decomposition results

Table 4 presents the results from the decomposition of the gender wage gap for employees in the private sector. Note that the sample only contains workers who were working on average at least 35 hours per week on at least 270 days in 2007. In the private sector, women earn on average 23% less than men, without controlling for differences in characteristics. The mean wage difference can be in part explained by differences in characteristics, for example, about 30% of the mean difference can be attributed to differences in formal education or experience. If we use all available information in our data, i.e., controlling for differences in occupation or firm characteristics, we can ascribe almost 50% of the mean wage difference to differences in observable characteristics.

In particular, we find that firm-specific variables contribute to the explanation of the gender pay gap. For example, the more women work in a firm, the lower is the gender pay gap. Or, if we extend the set of explanatory variables accounting for human capital (eduction, experience, etc), occupation and industry to include the firm-specific variables as well, the share of the unexplained gender pay gap decreases from about 68% to about 51%. This is a difference of about 17 percentage points. The remainder, the unexplained wage gap, must be ascribed to differential returns to characteristics. Table 5 tabulates the results from the same analysis, using employees from both the private and public sector.

#### 4.2 Wage differences over the distribution of wages

The estimated quantile regressions are tabulated in Tables 6 and 7 for the full-time female and male employees in the private sector and in Tables 8 and 9 for female and male full-time employees in both the private and public sectors. For ease of comparison, the first columns in these Tables re-produce the OLS regression results. It is perhaps tedious to compare the estimated coefficients across specifications and a graphical representation, Figure 3, permits a more immediate way of interpreting the results. The blue line decreases over the quantiles of the wage distribution and indicates that wage gap between women and men increases over the wage distribution, however, it is fairly flat over the majority of the distribution. With respect to the explained and unexplained characteristics, we see that at the bottom of the distribution, observed characteristics explain more of the difference than at the intermediate levels (red line).

The differences in returns (green line) are greater at the top of the distribution than at the bottom, which corresponds to an increase of the unexplained part of the wage gap over the wage distribution. This result can be explained by collective bargaining that imposes minimum pay for employment at the bottom of the distribution. Wages at the top of the wage distributions in the private sector are typically the outcome of personal bargaining and thus more flexible. If women have less bargaining power, demand lower wages or are discriminated against, we expect such a distribution of the wage gap. A similar picture is given in Figure 4, where we combine the observations from the private and public sectors.

## 5 Summary and conclusions

We constructed a new data set from administrative sources and decomposed the wages of men and women in Austria. The new data permit a more adequate analysis of the wage differences between women and men. In particular, we use log hourly wages constructed from tax records, employees' characteristics obtained from micro-censuses, and life-time employment histories from social security records. These data allow us to control for differences in formal education, and also in differences in work experiences along with differences in household, workplace, industry or firm characteristics. In contrast to previous research, we also obtained exact measures of experience and work interruptions. All these contribute significantly to the explanation of the gender wage.

Our descriptive analyzes confirm earlier results, women earn on average less then men, they are on average better formally educated than men, but have on average less workplace experience, probably due to child bearing (Böheim et al., 2007; Grünberger and Zulehner, 2009; Pointner and Stiglbauer, 2010). Taking observed differences between women and men into account, by decomposing the mean wage gap, we find that about 50% of the wage gap is due to "fair" discrimination, i.e., observable differences in characteristics. However, the remaining part of the wage gap between women and men cannot be explained by such characteristics. Part of this difference might be caused by unobserved characteristics, e.g., attitude and commitment, however, it is likely that (some of) this difference is caused by unfair discrimination against women.

In order to shed more light on this question, we analyzed the gender wage gap by the quantiles of the wage distributions. We estimated counterfactual distributions, allowing the decomposition of changes in the wage distribution into changes in the regression coefficients, changes in the distribution of covariates and changes in the residuals. Here we find that the wage gap is narrower at the bottom of the distribution than the top, where it is wider. We interpret this widening of the wage gap over the wage distribution as evidence that women fare worse in individual bargaining than men as most low paying jobs are covered by (industry-wide) collective bargaining agreements. In top-paying jobs, individual bargaining is the norm.

In addition, by comparing the public with the private sector, we also see a much narrower gender wage gap in the public sector, which is still dominated by pay scales, than in the private sector.

We can currently only speculate why women fare worse under individual bargaining than men as we lack appropriate data to investigate this question. However, there are several hypotheses, the probably most prominent is that women are unfairly discriminated against. Another explanation is that women, either because of risk-aversion or cultural reasons, bargain for lower wages than men (Bertrand, 2010; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Riley-Bowles et al., 2005). Given that the gender pay gap at the top of the wage distribution is wide, it warrants to continue to investigate this question.

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# A Figures





Figure 1: Kernel density of wages in the private sector.

Note: 3446 women and 8919 men in private sector employment. Full-time employees only.





*Note:* 5422 women and 11043 men in private and public sector employment. Full-time employees only.




Figure 3: Quantile decomposition of wages in the private sector.

Note: 3446 women and 8919 men sector employment. Full-time employees only.




Figure 4: Quantile decomposition of wages in the private and public sector.

 $\it Note:~5422$  women and 11043 men in private and public sector employment. Full-time employees only.

## **B** Tables

	Private se	ector	Private +	Public
	Women	Men	Women	Mer
Gross hourly wage $(\in)$	13.120	17.086	14.379	17.503
	(5.978)	(8.018)	(6.358)	(7.997)
Education			× ,	· · · ·
Compulsory school	0.230	0.152	0.190	0.137
Apprenticeship	0.344	0.509	0.273	0.482
Secondary school	0.161	0.075	0.201	0.082
High school	0.194	0.136	0.182	0.141
Crafts diploma	0.005	0.065	0.004	0.058
Technical college	0.015	0.012	0.060	0.02
University (Bachelor, Master, MBA)	0.044	0.042	0.077	0.063
University (PhD)	0.007	0.008	0.012	0.01
Age	35.624	37.479	37.646	38.563
-	(11.625)	(11.275)	(11.492)	(11.169)
Experience	14.823	18.396	15.878	18.89
-	(9.682)	(10.467)	(9.497)	(10.169)
Tenure (years)	8.030	9.351	9.254	10.274
(° )	(7.357)	(8.582)	(7.734)	(8.719)
Length of interruptions (years)	1.004	0.596	0.951	0.55'
	(1.564)	(1.035)	(1.517)	(1.030)
Length of parental leave	0.382	0.002	0.402	0.00
	(0.824)	(0.051)	(0.839)	(0.059)
Time in military	0.000	0.051	0.000	0.04
	(0.011)	(0.176)	(0.009)	(0.174)
Time out of labor force	0.140	0.124	0.131	0.12
	(0.829)	(0.635)	(0.780)	(0.643)
Time unemployed	0.435	0.349	0.374	0.31'
	(0.863)	(0.731)	(0.814)	(0.711)
Time sick	0.047	0.070	0.044	0.06
	(0.160)	(0.181)	(0.158)	(0.179)
Number of jobs	6.371	7.641	6.273	7.478
	(6.641)	(7.515)	(6.410)	(7.513)
Married	0.490	0.650	0.523	0.675
Executive position	0.040	0.073	0.044	0.079
Firmsize				
Firm size: 1-10	0.230	0.153	0.204	0.150
Firm size: 11-19	0.146	0.124	0.142	0.123
Firm size: 20-49	0.191	0.188	0.205	0.195
Firm size: 50-499	0.331	0.383	0.338	0.380
Firm size: 500+	0.102	0.153	0.111	0.140
Firm size unknown	0.023	0.027	0.024	0.02'
Log workplace size	4.632	4.750	5.295	4.960
	(1.891)	(1.814)	(2.168)	(1.930)
Average age of the firm	23.625	24.039	22.907	23.525

Table 1: Summary statistics, mean (standard deviation).

Table 1 – continued from	Private se	0	Private + Public		
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
Average age in the firm	37.492	37.679	39.052	38.506	
Average age in the infin	(4.568)	(4.431)	(5.038)	(4.673)	
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	0.532	0.266	(5.058) 0.586	0.315	
Ratio remaie to male workers in the min	(0.242)	(0.203)	(0.224)	(0.228)	
Ratio female to male wage in the firm	(0.242) 0.796	0.762	0.809	0.767	
Ratio female to male wage in the min	(0.411)	(0.258)	(0.354)	(0.246)	
Worker turnover in the firm	(0.411) 41.580	4.212	(0.354) 27.256	(0.240) 4.792	
worker turnover in the infin	(1050)	(292)	(837)	(264)	
Public sector	(1050)	(232)	(0.364)	(204) 0.192	
Occupation			0.004	0.152	
Soldiers, administrative officers	0.040	0.081	0.034	0.083	
Researchers	0.040 0.033	0.046	0.119	0.083	
Engineers	0.035 0.226	0.040 0.197	0.119 0.253	0.082 0.195	
Office workers	0.220 0.311	0.197	0.253 0.251	0.135	
Sales	0.311 0.184	0.085 0.055	0.231 0.178	0.083	
Craftspersons	$0.184 \\ 0.042$	$0.000 \\ 0.308$	0.178	0.083 0.259	
Assembly workers	$0.042 \\ 0.035$	0.308 0.132	0.028 0.026	$0.239 \\ 0.115$	
Unskilled workers	$0.035 \\ 0.129$	0.132 0.095	0.020	0.115	
Sector	0.129	0.095	0.111	0.094	
Agriculture, fishery, mining	0.012	0.014	0.009	0.013	
Manufacturing	0.245	0.387	0.157	0.315	
Energy, water suppliers, traffic and communication Construction	0.071	0.090	0.048	0.077	
Whole sale and retail	$0.040 \\ 0.272$	0.150	0.026	0.125	
Tourism	0.272 0.110	$0.176 \\ 0.029$	$0.174 \\ 0.071$	$0.144 \\ 0.023$	
Banks, insurance Real estate	0.089	0.052	0.056	0.042	
	0.103	0.064	0.067	0.053	
Others Citizenship	0.058	0.036	0.392	0.208	
Citizenship	0.017	0.010	0.091	0.000	
Austrian	0.917	0.912	0.931	0.923	
EU 15	0.018	0.016	0.015	0.015	
Others	0.065	0.072	0.054	0.062	
Population density	0.044	0.000	0.050	0.070	
High	0.344	0.263	0.356	0.276	
Medium	0.251	0.269	0.243	0.267	
Low	0.405	0.468	0.401	0.457	
Region	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Burgenland	0.083	0.083	0.086	0.088	
Lower Austria	0.128	0.126	0.130	0.128	
Vienna	0.137	0.090	0.147	0.097	
Carinthia	0.095	0.100	0.105	0.103	
Steiermark	0.100	0.120	0.114	0.120	
Upper Austria	0.115	0.148	0.102	0.136	
Salzburg	0.121	0.106	0.119	0.111	
Tirol	0.108	0.105	0.098	0.104	
Vorarlberg	0.113	0.123	0.099	0.115	
Number of observations	3,446	8,919	$5,\!422$	11,043	

Table  $1-{\rm continued}$  from previous page

	Specific		Specific	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Constant	1.615	1.871	1.610	1.832
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Education (reference group: compulsory school)				
Apprenticeship	0.189	0.249	0.184	0.217
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary school	0.245	0.290	0.242	0.261
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High school	0.381	0.442	0.377	0.410
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Craftsmen diploma	0.263	0.312	0.263	0.281
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Technical college	0.502	0.485	0.500	0.475
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
University (Bachelor, Master, MBA)	0.604	0.623	0.598	0.603
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
University (PhD)	0.728	0.711	0.704	0.684
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Experience	0.049	0.049	0.051	0.057
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Experience squared $\times$ 100	-0.099	-0.098	-0.104	-0.112
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Tenure	0.010	0.007	0.009	0.006
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure squared $\times$ 100	0.002	0.010	0.005	0.012
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Length of interruptions	0.003	0.005		
	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Length of interruptions $\times$ 100	-0.043	-0.127		
	(0.12)	(0.10)		
Time unemployed			-0.002	-0.018
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Time out of labor force			0.014	0.013
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of parental leave			-0.009	-0.025
			(0.01)	(0.06)
Time in military			0.411	0.259
			(0.43)	(0.02)
Time sick			-0.067	-0.041
			(0.03)	(0.02)
Married	0.003	0.056	0.006	0.065
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Citizenship (reference group: others)	× /	. ,	. /	. ,
Austrian citizenship	-0.021	-0.046	-0.019	-0.066
-	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
EU15 citizenship	0.052	0.074	0.059	0.091
-	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
	× /	( /	ued on ne	( )

Table 2: Estimated wage regressions for the private sector.

Table 2 – continued from previou	Specifica	ation 1	Specification 2		
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
Population density (reference group: high)					
Medium	-0.005	-0.002	-0.006	-0.003	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Low	-0.035	-0.015	-0.037	-0.017	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Region (reference group: Vienna)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Burgenland	-0.042	0.013	-0.043	0.010	
Dargemana	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	
Lower Austria	-0.007	0.018	-0.010	0.014	
	(0.02)	(0.010)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Carinthia	-0.060	-0.026	-0.061	-0.029	
Carmonia	(0.02)	(0.020	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Steiermark	-0.060	(0.02) -0.013	-0.062	(0.02)	
50000 mark	(0.02)	(0.013)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Upper Austria	-0.039	(0.02) 0.036	-0.039	(0.02) 0.031	
oppor musura	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.031)	
Salaburg	-0.010	(0.02) 0.007	(0.02) -0.014	(0.02) 0.003	
Salzburg	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.003)	
Tirol	· · · · ·	. ,	· /	. ,	
11101	-0.008	0.043	-0.010	0.038	
¥7	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Voralberg	0.017	0.069	0.015	0.061	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Worker status (reference group: white collar)	0.045	0.000	0.045	0.000	
Blue collar worker	-0.047	-0.093	-0.045	-0.093	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Occupation (reference group: soldiers, administrative officers)	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.014	
Researchers	0.039	-0.015	0.032	-0.014	
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	
Engineers	-0.011	-0.108	-0.013	-0.106	
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	
Office workers	-0.026	-0.136	-0.028	-0.135	
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	
sales	-0.160	-0.254	-0.163	-0.247	
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	
Craftspersons	-0.178	-0.175	-0.181	-0.174	
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	
Assembly workers	-0.120	-0.220	-0.117	-0.219	
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	
Unskilled workers	-0.143	-0.178	-0.142	-0.177	
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	
Industry (reference group: agriculture, fishery, mining)					
Manufacturing	0.128	0.100	0.128	0.100	
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	
Energy, water suppliers, traffic and communication	0.061	0.009	0.060	0.010	
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	
Construction	0.100	0.103	0.099	0.105	
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	
Whole sale and retail	0.078	0.024	0.077	0.024	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	

Table 2 – continued from previo	us page
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Table 2 – continued nom pre				
				Men
Tourism				-0.046
100118111				
Banks, insurance	· /	· /	( /	$(0.03) \\ 0.152$
Dairks, insurance				(0.132)
Real estate		· /	· · · ·	(0.03) 0.074
nearestate	Specification 1         Specificat			(0.074)
Others	Specification 1         Specifica		( /	-0.012
Others				(0.012)
Executive position	( )	· · · ·	· · · ·	(0.03) 0.085
Executive position				(0.01)
Establishment size (reference group: 1-10)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
11-19	0.036	-0.005	0.035	-0.005
11 10				(0.01)
20-49	( )		· · · ·	0.029
-0 10				(0.01)
50-499	( )	· · · ·	0.075	0.053
			(0.02)	(0.01)
500+			0.158	0.078
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
unknown	· /	· /	-0.008	-0.004
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Log Firm size	· /	· /	0.016	0.034
-	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Average age in the firm	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	-0.185	-0.235	-0.184	-0.223
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ratio female to male wages in the firm	0.017	-0.163	0.018	-0.155
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worker turnover in the firm	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of observations			3446	8919
Adjusted R-squared	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.63

Table 2 – continued from previous page

*Note:* Ordinary least square regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 3446 women and 8919 men in private sector employment. Full-time employees only. Specification 1 includes the length of an individual's interruptions in the labor market and its squared, whereas specification 2 replaces these two variables by time unemployed, time out of labor force, length of parental leave, time in military and time sick.

	Specific	ation 1	Specification 2		
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
Constant	1.625	1.848	1.614	1.815	
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	
Education (reference group: compulsory school)		. ,	. ,	. ,	
Apprenticeship	0.180	0.230	0.176	0.205	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Secondary school	0.256	0.284	0.253	0.261	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
High school	0.371	0.431	0.368	0.406	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Craftsmen diploma	0.281	0.295	0.277	0.272	
	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)	
Technical college	0.415	0.451	0.411	0.434	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
University (Bachelor, Master, MBA)	0.538	0.612	0.532	0.593	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
University (PhD)	0.616	0.666	0.603	0.644	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Experience	0.045	0.049	0.046	0.056	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Experience squared $\times$ 100	-0.086	-0.096	-0.089	-0.109	
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	
Tenure	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.006	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Tenure squared $\times$ 100	-0.002	0.010	0.000	0.012	
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	
Length of interruptions	-0.002	-0.001			
	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Length of interruptions $\times$ 100	0.028	-0.064			
	(0.09)	(0.09)			
Time unemployed			-0.000	-0.022	
			(0.01)	(0.00)	
Time out of labor force			0.013	0.013	
			(0.00)	(0.00)	
Length of maternity leave			-0.010	-0.080	
			(0.00)	(0.05)	
Time in military			0.345	0.209	
			(0.42)	(0.02)	
Time sick			-0.062	-0.040	
	0.000	0.050	(0.03)	(0.02)	
Married	0.006	0.058	0.009	0.065	
Citizenshire (metanene en en el )	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Citizenship (reference group: others)	0.009	0.094	0.000	0.050	
Austria	-0.023	-0.034	-0.022	-0.050	
DI11 M	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
EU15	0.120	0.083	0.125	0.098	
	(0.04)	$\frac{(0.03)}{Contin}$	(0.04)	(0.03)	
		Contir	nued on ne	xt page	

Table 3: Estimated wage regressions for private and public sector.

Table 5 – continued nom previo	Specification 1		Specification 2		
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
Population density (reference group: high)	Women	mon	Women	mon	
Medium	-0.012	-0.004	-0.013	-0.005	
weedum	(0.012)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	
Low	-0.023	-0.018	-0.023	-0.020	
EOW	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Region (reference group: Vienna)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Burgenland	-0.031	0.013	-0.031	0.010	
Durgemand		(0.013)			
Lower Austria	(0.02) -0.001	(0.02) 0.014	(0.02) -0.003	$(0.02) \\ 0.011$	
Lower Austria					
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Carinthia	-0.039	-0.024	-0.040	-0.027	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Steiermark	-0.028	-0.013	-0.029	-0.014	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Upper Austria	-0.023	0.032	-0.023	0.026	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Salzburg	-0.003	0.003	-0.005	-0.002	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Tirol	0.008	0.034	0.006	0.029	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Vorarlberg	0.032	0.065	0.031	0.058	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Worker status (reference group: white collar)		· /	× /	· /	
Blue collar worker	-0.070	-0.092	-0.069	-0.092	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Civil servants	0.015	-0.006	0.014	-0.013	
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Other public sector employees	-0.071	-0.115	-0.070	-0.117	
Company Provide Company Com	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Occupation (reference group: soldiers, administrative officers)	(0.01)	(0.0_)	(0.0_)	(0.0-)	
Researchers	0.038	-0.016	0.037	-0.013	
itesearchers	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.010)	
Engineers	-0.044	-0.080	-0.044	-0.076	
Lingineers	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	
Office workers	-0.088	(0.01) -0.110	-0.089	(0.01) -0.107	
Office workers	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)	
Color	( /	· · · ·	(0.02)	(0.01) -0.177	
Sales	-0.186	-0.183	-0.186		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Craftspersons	-0.228	-0.150	-0.229	-0.147	
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	
Assembly workers	-0.158	-0.196	-0.154	-0.192	
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	
Unskilled workers	-0.178	-0.153	-0.175	-0.150	
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	
Industry (reference group: agriculture, fishery, mining)					
Manufacturing	0.123	0.124	0.124	0.124	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Energy, water suppliers, traffic and communication	0.065	0.033	0.065	0.035	
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
		-		xt page	

Table 3 – continued from previous page

	Specific	ation 1	Specifica	ation 2
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Construction	0.103	0.123	0.104	0.125
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Whole sale and retail	0.057	0.040	0.057	0.039
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Tourism	-0.034	-0.060	-0.033	-0.060
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Banks, insurance	0.252	0.173	0.253	0.169
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Real estate	0.144	0.086	0.142	0.090
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Others	0.095	0.008	0.095	0.005
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Executive position	0.117	0.092	0.118	0.093
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Establishment size (reference group: 1-10)				
11-19	0.050	0.001	0.050	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
20-49	0.065	0.036	0.064	0.037
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
50-499	0.091	0.059	0.090	0.059
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
500+	0.153	0.089	0.152	0.089
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
unknown	-0.028	0.003	-0.025	-0.001
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Log Firm size	0.017	0.028	0.017	0.028
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Average age in the firm	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.004
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	-0.164	-0.221	-0.162	-0.208
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ratio female to male wages in the firm	0.024	-0.179	0.024	-0.171
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Worker turnover in the firm	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of charmentions	F 400	11049	F 400	11049
Number of observations	5422	11043	5422	11043
Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.62	0.64	0.63

Table 3 – continued from previous page

*Note:* Ordinary least square regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 5422 women and 11043 men in private and public sector employment. Full-time employees only. Specification 1 includes the length of an individual's interruptions in the labor market and its squared, whereas specification 2 replaces these two variables by time unemployed, time out of labor force, length of parental leave, time in military and time sick.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Differences in observed characteristics, $\Delta X$		0.070	0.075	0.120
in % of the raw gap $(23.4\%)$		30,0	32,0	49,0
Differences in returns, $\Delta \hat{\beta}$ (Reimers, 1983)	0,255	$0,\!185$	0,180	0,135
in % of the raw gap $(23.4\%)$	,	70,0	68,0	51,0
Education, experience, tenure, interruptions,				
family status, citizenship, region, density		х	х	х
Worker status, occupation, industry			х	х
Establishment size, firm characteristics, hierarchy				х
Number of observations	$12,\!365$	$12,\!365$	$12,\!365$	12,365

Table 4: Decompositions of the wage difference for the private sector.

*Note:* Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. 3446 women and 8919 men in private sector employment. Full-time employees only. For the decomposition three specifications based on specification 1 as depicted in Table 2 are used: In column (2), the independent variables are education, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, interruptions, interruptions squared, family status, citizenship, dummy variables for regions and population density. In column (3), we add dummy variables for worker status, occupation and industry and in column (4), we add dummy variables for establishment size, logarithm of firm size, average age of workers in the firm, Ratio female to male workers in the firm, ratio female to male wages in the firm, worker turnover in the firm and a dummy variable for a leading position.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Differences in observed characteristics, $\Delta X$		0.070	0.075	0.120
in % of the raw gap $(18.1\%)$		15,2	$17,\!8$	38,7
Differences in returns, $\Delta \hat{\beta}$ (Reimers, 1983)	0,191	0,162	$0,\!157$	$0,\!117$
in % of the raw gap $(18.1\%)$		84,8	82,2	$61,\!3$
Education, experience, interruptions,				
family status, citizenship, region, density		х	х	х
Worker status, occupation, industry			х	х
Establishment size, firm characteristics, hierarchy				Х
Number of observations	16,465	16,465	$16,\!465$	$16,\!465$

Table 5: Decompositions of the wage difference for the private and public sector.

*Note:* Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. 5422 women and 11043 men in private and public sector employment. Full-time employees only. For the decomposition three specifications based on specification 1 as depicted in Table 3 are used: In column (2), the independent variables are education, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, interruptions, interruptions squared, family status, citizenship, dummy variables for regions and population density. In column (3), we add dummy variables for worker status, occupation and industry and in column (4), we add dummy variables for establishment size, logarithm of firm size, average age of workers in the firm, Ratio female to male workers in the firm, ratio female to male wages in the firm, worker turnover in the firm and a dummy variable for a leading position.

	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
Constant	1.615	1.314	1.387	1.800	2.046	2.353
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Education (reference group: compulsory school)						
Apprenticeship	0.189	0.227	0.222	0.141	0.115	0.108
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secondary school	0.245	0.261	0.277	0.212	0.190	0.194
·	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High school	0.381	0.441	0.420	0.327	0.311	0.291
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Craftsmen diploma	0.263	0.228	0.345	0.192	0.218	0.168
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Technical college	0.502	0.493	0.521	0.477	0.397	0.394
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
University (Bachelor, Master, MBA)	0.604	0.583	0.633	0.538	0.554	0.517
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
University (PhD)	0.728	(0.00) 0.758	0.795	(0.00) 0.617	0.659	0.626
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.020
Experience	0.049	0.058	0.049	0.044	0.040	0.040
Experience	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.040)
Experience squared $\times$ 100	-0.099	(0.00) -0.122	(0.00) -0.101	-0.090	-0.076	(0.00) -0.074
Experience squared × 100	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.014)
Tenure	(0.01) 0.010	(0.01) 0.009	(0.01) 0.012	(0.01) 0.008	(0.01) 0.007	(0.01) 0.007
Tellule						
T 1 × 100	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure squared $\times$ 100	0.002	0.010	-0.002	0.010	0.012	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of interruptions	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.008	0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of interruptions $\times$ 100	-0.043	0.006	0.001	-0.047	-0.118	-0.174
	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Married	0.003	-0.018	0.002	0.008	0.010	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Citizenship (reference group: others)						
Austrian	-0.021	-0.012	0.025	0.017	-0.033	-0.050
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
EU15	0.052	0.085	0.071	0.029	0.031	0.044
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Population density (reference group: high)						
Medium	-0.005	-0.010	-0.036	-0.004	0.003	0.024
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low	-0.035	-0.027	-0.050	-0.041	-0.022	-0.022
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worker status (reference group: white collar)						
Blue collar worker	-0.047	-0.065	-0.076	-0.070	-0.077	-0.083
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Executive position	0.076	0.090	0.066	0.071	0.109	0.113
*	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Establishment size (reference group: 1-10)	( )	( )	()	( )	(	()
Erono Shoup, 1 10)				Continu	ied on ne	xt nage
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Table 6: OLS and Quantile regressions for women in the private sector.	Table 6: OLS ar	nd Quantile	regressions	for wo	omen in	the	private	sector.
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	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
11-19	0.036	0.044	0.043	0.020	0.021	0.023
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
20-49	0.065	0.071	0.063	0.045	0.026	0.019
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
50-499	0.076	0.098	0.069	0.065	0.032	0.035
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
500+	0.160	0.164	0.164	0.149	0.099	0.113
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
unknown	-0.009	-0.048	-0.009	-0.031	-0.027	-0.041
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Log Firm size	0.016	0.017	0.014	0.012	0.019	0.017
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Average age in the firm	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	-0.185	-0.166	-0.172	-0.169	-0.197	-0.233
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ratio female to male wages in the firm	0.017	-0.050	-0.017	0.036	0.084	0.095
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worker turnover in the firm	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of observations	3446	3446	3446	3446	3446	3446

Table 6 – continued from previous page

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. 3446 women in private sector employment. Full-time employees only. Specification 1 as depicted in Table 2 is used. All regressions include region, occupation and industry effects.

	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
Constant	1.871	1.395	1.628	1.999	2.307	2.375
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Education (reference group: compulsory school)						
Apprenticeship	0.249	0.363	0.309	0.212	0.165	0.140
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary school	0.290	0.361	0.327	0.269	0.222	0.187
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High school	0.442	0.574	0.509	0.393	0.330	0.314
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Craftsmen diploma	0.312	0.429	0.363	0.284	0.223	0.196
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical college	0.485	0.512	0.540	0.484	0.392	0.342
-	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
University (Bachelor, Master, MBA)	0.623	0.710	0.669	0.579	0.556	0.550
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
University (PhD)	0.711	0.717	0.704	0.664	0.698	0.704
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Experience	0.049	0.055	0.053	0.045	0.039	0.037
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Experience squared $\times$ 100	-0.098	-0.109	-0.107	-0.091	-0.076	-0.069
Experience squared × 100	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Tenure	0.007	0.009	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.004
Tenure	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure squared $\times$ 100	0.010	0.007	0.012	0.022	0.020	(0.00) 0.017
Tenure squared × 100	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of interruptions	0.005	(0.01) 0.017	0.003	-0.008	-0.010	-0.018
Length of Interruptions	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of interruptions $\times$ 100	(0.01) -0.127	-0.225	-0.086	(0.01) -0.071	(0.01) 0.007	0.066
Length of Interruptions × 100		(0.12)				
Manniad	$(0.10) \\ 0.056$	(0.12) 0.054	$(0.09) \\ 0.058$	$(0.10) \\ 0.043$	$(0.12) \\ 0.040$	(0.14) 0.038
Married						
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Citizenship (reference group: others)	0.040	0.000	0.022	0.001	0.010	0.000
Austrian	-0.046	-0.026	-0.033	-0.021	-0.016	0.000
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
EU15	0.074	0.068	0.047	0.037	0.066	0.141
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Population density (reference group: high)						
Medium	-0.002	-0.007	0.001	-0.000	-0.013	-0.020
_	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Low	-0.015	-0.029	-0.023	-0.017	-0.023	-0.019
Worker status (reference group: white collar)						
Blue collar worker	-0.093	-0.095	-0.085	-0.099	-0.125	-0.147
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Executive position	0.085	0.039	0.070	0.098	0.120	0.123
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Establishment size (reference group: 1-10)						
11-19	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002	0.005	-0.024	-0.037
				Continu	ied on ne	xt page

Table 7:	OLS	and	Quantile	$\operatorname{regressions}$	for	men	in	the	private	sector.

	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
20-49	0.028	0.024	0.028	0.029	0.013	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
50-499	0.054	0.036	0.040	0.056	0.046	0.037
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
500+	0.079	0.066	0.083	0.083	0.065	0.041
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
unknown	0.002	0.031	0.018	-0.009	-0.007	0.026
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log Firm size	0.034	0.039	0.036	0.031	0.029	0.029
Č	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Average age in the firm	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.006
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	-0.235	-0.251	-0.261	-0.287	-0.240	-0.231
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Ratio female to male wages in the firm	-0.163	-0.175	-0.149	-0.131	-0.118	-0.119
0	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worker turnover in the firm	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of observations	8919	8919	8919	8919	8919	8919

Table 7 - continued from previous page

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. 8919 men in private sector employment. Full-time employees only. Specification 1 as depicted in Table 2 is used. All regressions include region, occupation and industry effects.

OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
1.625	1.088	1.367	1.740	2.081	2.366
(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
				0.099	0.078
· /	· /			(0.01)	(0.02)
0.256	0.290		0.230	0.192	0.182
(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
0.371	0.433	0.402	0.326	0.291	0.259
(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
0.281	0.283	0.325	0.244	0.250	0.205
(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)
0.415	0.477	0.458	0.397	0.328	0.324
(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
· /	· /			· · · ·	0.475
					(0.03)
· /	· /	· · · ·		· · · ·	0.530
					(0.06)
· /				( /	0.036
					(0.00)
· /	· /	· /	· · · ·	· · · ·	-0.065
					(0.01)
· /		· /	· · · ·		0.005
					(0.00)
· /			· · · ·	· · · ·	0.010
					(0.010)
· /	· /			· · · ·	-0.002
	· /	· /	· · · ·	· · · ·	(0.01)
					-0.065
· /	· /		· · · ·	· · · ·	(0.12)
					0.004
(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
					-0.026
· /	· /	· /	· · · ·	· · · ·	(0.03)
					0.121
(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
-0.012	-0.033	-0.023	0.002	0.005	0.015
(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
-0.023	-0.025	-0.023	-0.015	-0.012	-0.009
	(0.02)				(0.02)
· /	· /	· /	· · /	× /	· /
-0.070	-0.063	-0.091	-0.080	-0.090	-0.121
					(0.02)
	· /	· /	· · · ·	( /	0.003
(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)
				10.047	10.001
(0.02) -0.071	-0.045	-0.066	-0.068	-0.089	-0.093
	$\begin{array}{c} 1.625 \\ (0.07) \\ 0.180 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.256 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.371 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.371 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.281 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.415 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.538 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.616 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.538 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.616 \\ (0.04) \\ 0.045 \\ (0.00) \\ -0.086 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.008 \\ (0.00) \\ -0.002 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.002 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.028 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.006 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.028 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.006 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.028 \\ (0.02) \\ 0.120 \\ (0.04) \\ -0.012 \\ (0.01) \\ -0.023 \\ (0.01) \\ -0.070 \\ (0.01) \\ 0.015 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1.625 $1.088$ $1.367$ $1.740$ $(0.07)$ $(0.13)$ $(0.09)$ $(0.06)$ $0.180$ $0.229$ $0.204$ $0.137$ $(0.01)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $0.256$ $0.290$ $0.283$ $0.230$ $(0.01)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $0.371$ $0.433$ $0.402$ $0.326$ $(0.01)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $0.371$ $0.433$ $0.402$ $0.326$ $(0.01)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $0.371$ $0.433$ $0.402$ $0.326$ $(0.01)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $0.013$ $0.021$ $0.415$ $0.477$ $0.458$ $0.397$ $0.022$ $0.044$ $0.522$ $(0.02)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.33)$ $(0.02)$ $0.044$ $0.039$ $(0.04)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.55)$ $(0.33)$ $0.006$ $(0.04)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.05)$ $(0.03)$ <	1.625 $1.088$ $1.367$ $1.740$ $2.081$ $(0.07)$ $(0.13)$ $(0.09)$ $(0.06)$ $(0.07)$ $0.180$ $0.229$ $0.204$ $0.137$ $0.099$ $(0.01)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.01)$ $0.256$ $0.290$ $0.283$ $0.230$ $0.192$ $(0.01)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.01)$ $0.371$ $0.433$ $0.402$ $0.326$ $0.291$ $(0.01)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.01)$ $(0.02)$ $0.281$ $0.283$ $0.325$ $0.244$ $0.250$ $(0.06)$ $(0.09)$ $(0.08)$ $(0.05)$ $(0.03)$ $0.415$ $0.477$ $0.458$ $0.397$ $0.328$ $(0.02)$ $(0.04)$ $(0.03)$ $(0.02)$ $(0.02)$ $0.616$ $0.619$ $0.578$ $0.540$ $0.562$ $(0.04)$ $(0.07)$ $(0.05)$ $(0.3)$ $(0.04)$

Table 8: OLS and Quantile regressions for women in the private and public sector.
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	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Executive position	0.117	0.110	0.104	0.117	0.112	0.130
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Establishment size (reference group: 1-10)	· /	· /	× /	· /	· /	· /
11-19	0.050	0.057	0.048	0.037	0.043	0.042
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
20-49	0.065	0.069	0.061	0.047	0.057	0.055
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
50-499	0.091	0.114	0.086	0.078	0.071	0.076
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
500+	0.153	0.160	0.140	0.129	0.132	0.146
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
unknown	-0.028	-0.082	-0.033	-0.045	-0.026	-0.031
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Log Firm size	0.017	0.023	0.019	0.014	0.015	0.012
~	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Average age in the firm	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	-0.164	-0.116	-0.143	-0.138	-0.170	-0.222
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Ratio female to male wages in the firm	0.024	-0.010	0.006	0.052	0.080	0.087
C C	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Worker turnover in the firm	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of observations	5422	5422	5422	5422	5422	5422

Table 8 - continued from previous page

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. 5422 women in private and public sector employment. Full-time employees only. Specification 1 as depicted in Table 3 is used. All regressions include region, occupation and industry effects.

	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
Constant	1.848	1.309	1.569	1.955	2.266	2.360
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (reference group: compulsory school)						
Apprenticeship	0.230	0.323	0.282	0.194	0.145	0.122
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary school	0.284	0.357	0.328	0.260	0.212	0.175
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High school	0.431	0.552	0.488	0.384	0.323	0.299
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Craftsmen diploma	0.295	0.394	0.341	0.264	0.210	0.174
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Technical college	0.451	0.542	0.510	0.454	0.356	0.308
-	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
University (Bachelor, Master, MBA)	0.612	0.666	0.630	0.578	0.548	0.535
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
University (PhD)	0.666	0.676	0.689	0.615	0.644	0.614
0 )	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Experience	0.049	0.055	0.053	0.044	0.038	0.036
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Experience squared $\times$ 100	-0.096	-0.111	-0.107	-0.088	-0.074	-0.068
Experience squared × 100	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure	0.008	0.009	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.004
Tenure	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.001)
Tenure squared $\times$ 100	0.010	0.005	0.011	0.020	0.019	0.019
Tenure squared × 100	(0.010)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of interruptions	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.011	-0.026	-0.033
Lengen of meet aptions	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Length of interruptions $\times$ 100	-0.064	-0.022	-0.054	-0.006	(0.01) 0.154	(0.01) 0.205
Lengen of interruptions × 100	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.134)	(0.12)
Married	(0.05) 0.058	0.060	0.056	0.044	0.044	(0.12) 0.046
Manneu	(0.033)	(0.000)	(0.01)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)
Citizenship (reference group: others)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Austrian	-0.034	-0.029	-0.017	-0.020	-0.004	0.018
Austhan	(0.01)	(0.029)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.013)
EU15	(0.01) 0.083	(0.02) 0.044	(0.02) 0.077	(0.02) 0.039	· · · ·	. ,
E013					0.069	0.140
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Population density (reference group: high)	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.010
Medium	-0.004	-0.001	0.002	-0.005	-0.008	-0.016
T	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Low	-0.018	-0.021	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020	-0.019
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Worker status (reference group: white collar)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0 1 1 0	0.100
Blue collar worker	-0.092	-0.099	-0.089	-0.096	-0.112	-0.130
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Civil servants	-0.006	-0.004	-0.010	0.001	0.014	-0.028
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Other public sector employees	-0.115	-0.098	-0.098	-0.085	-0.125	-0.175
				Continu	ied on ne	xt page

Table 9:	OLS	and	Quantile	regressions	for	men	in	the	$\operatorname{private}$	and	public secto	or.

	OLS	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Executive position	0.092	0.037	0.063	0.108	0.133	0.132
-	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Establishment size (reference group: 1-10)	· · · ·	· /	· · /	· /	· /	· · ·
11-19	0.001	0.017	-0.003	0.015	-0.013	-0.030
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
20-49	0.036	0.033	0.027	0.041	0.023	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
50-499	0.059	0.046	0.041	0.063	0.050	0.037
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
500+	0.089	0.075	0.087	0.102	0.078	0.059
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Firm size unknown	0.003	0.006	-0.008	-0.004	0.018	0.041
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log Firm size	0.028	0.030	0.029	0.025	0.023	0.021
-	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Average age in the firm	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.006
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ratio female to male workers in the firm	-0.221	-0.196	-0.230	-0.256	-0.220	-0.225
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ratio female to male wages in the firm	-0.179	-0.163	-0.161	-0.145	-0.135	-0.125
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worker turnover in the firm	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of observations	11043	11043	11043	11043	11043	11043

Table 9 - continued from previous page

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. 11043 men in private and public sector employment. Full-time employees only. Specification 1 as depicted in Table 3 is used. All regressions include region, occupation and industry effects.